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Transhumanism has a great deal in common with religion as traditionally conceived. James J. 
Hughes claims that “a variety of metaphysics appear to be compatible with one form of 
transhumanism or the other, from various Abrahamic views of the soul to Buddho-Hindu ideas 
of reincarnation to animist ideas.”1 Most notably, the range of technologically optimistic views 
held by transhumanists shares with many religions a longing for transcendence of our presently 
frail and limited situation. In contrast to the doctrines of many traditional religions, however, 
transhumanist salvation will come not with the aid of divine intervention, but solely from our 
own ingenuity (or at least from the ingenuity of beings that result from our own ingenuity). Due 
to its obvious Enlightenment humanist bent, the prevailing view has been that transhumanism 
adopts and secularizes religious tropes, but is importantly hostile to many traditional religions.2 
Nonetheless, there is a growing number of voices arguing that shared interests in the elimination 
of suffering, the immersion of individual minds in a universal intelligence, or the remaking of the 
universe itself indicate that certain construals of transhumanism might actually be continuous 
with certain religious traditions.3 
While there may be some religions or sects that seem quite amenable to transhumanist 
views, I would like to focus on one common (but not universally sought) transhumanist goal that 
is inherently opposed to the core philosophical foundations of at least two major religions. What 
I have in mind is the goal of personal immortality made possible by technological advances. 
Although adherents of Abrahamic traditions, for example, would not be against the prospect of 
personal immortality in itself, they would likely object to the apparent hubris of humans trying to 
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usurp or bypass God’s role in the attainment of everlasting existence.4 However, if Hughes is 
right and “most transhumanists only use the term ‘immortality’…as a synonym for radical 
longevity,”5 then it becomes harder to distinguish, in any categorical way, transhumanist interest 
in life extension from the ordinary medical interventions that even zealous religious believers 
often take advantage of already; more to the point, it becomes harder (without indulging in 
hypocrisy) for such believers to accuse transhumanists of wanting to play God. For clearer 
examples of opposition to transhumanist immortality, one must turn to Hinduism and Buddhism. 
It is in the philosophical roots of these ancient Indian traditions that one can find arguments 
suggesting that any longing for extension of individual personalities will ultimately be 
problematic. 
 
Transhumanist Immortality 
Julian Huxley, who is credited with coining the term “transhumanism,” holds that  
The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself—not just sporadically, an 
individual here in one way, an individual there in another way, but in its entirety, 
as humanity. We need a name for this belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: 
man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of 
and for his human nature.6 
In the decades since this foundational statement, transhumanism has become increasingly 
organized as a movement, and well defined as a concept. Today it encompasses a cluster of 
commonly, but not universally, held aspirations for the expansion of human capabilities based on 
developments, or predicted developments, in “nanotechnology, biotechnology, robotics, 
informatics and communication technology, and applied cognitive science.”7 Given that its hopes 
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are pinned on human technology, it may be somewhat surprising that several compelling cases 
have been made for transhumanism’s continuity with religious traditions.8 It is probably beyond 
the scope of this paper to consider all of the arguments for such continuity, but it will be 
necessary to say more about certain apparent parallels when it comes to hope for personal 
immortality. Before returning to this issue, however, it will be helpful to have a clearer sense of 
both why many transhumanists are so attached to individual personhood that they want to see 
considerable resources dedicated to making its extension possible, and how, specifically, they 
envision making this extension a reality for themselves. 
 In most cases, it seems that transhumanists simply take for granted that the preservation 
of particular persons is worthwhile. What is more, transhumanists often also seem to take for 
granted that they understand what the preservation of particular persons means. This is an issue 
that demands more attention because conceptual confusion on this point makes it even more 
difficult to figure out how to bring about the preservation (and the technological side is already 
difficult enough). Unfortunately, explaining personal identity turns out to be a lot trickier than 
people used to think. Hughes, in pointing out tensions in its Enlightenment ideals of selfhood, 
suggests that, “Contemporary transhumanism has yet to grapple with the radical consequences of 
the erosion of liberal individualism on their projects of individually chosen enhancement and 
longevity.”9 Lacking a defensible articulation of what maintenance of personal identity across 
time consists of will certainly make transhumanists susceptible to the Indian critiques of ordinary 
notions of supposedly durable selfhood that will be discussed later, but this is not exactly the 
problem before us at the moment. Even if we grant a kind of casual, everyday notion of personal 
identity to transhumanists, we still need an answer to the question: why do they so badly want to 
see their personal identities persist? The answer, as Hughes suggests, lies in the Enlightenment 
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ideal of a certain sort of individualism. 
 The authors of Habits of the Heart consider the origins of what they call “ontological 
individualism,” and claim that it really started to take hold of Western culture several centuries 
ago when certain influential thinkers (beginning with John Locke) argued that society is a 
secondary phenomenon in the story of human development.10 Instead of assigning a more 
foundational role to the social element of human existence, these prominent Enlightenment 
figures “assume that the basic unit of human reality is the individual person.”11 There are a 
number of consequences of holding a view like this, but chief among them for our purposes is 
that the individual, with all of its preferences and interests, becomes extremely important. 
Although most transhumanists do not feel the need to argue for this importance explicitly, I think 
that this is because the primacy of individual experience is such a deeply engrained aspect of the 
tradition that they have inherited and carried forward. The increased value placed on the 
individual has had a profound impact on the modern attitudes of Westerners in general, and when 
combined with other Enlightenment trends—especially optimism about the promises of science 
and human ingenuity, and skepticism about putting faith entirely in traditional religions12—it is 
perhaps not so surprising that people of European descent began to dream of finding ways to 
keep themselves around.  
 When it comes to the actual means of doing so, there are a number of ways in which 
personal immortality, or at least indefinite extension of particular personalities, might be 
achieved, according to transhumanists. Moving from the more concrete and down-to-earth to the 
more abstract and far-fetched, some transhumanists believe that it is only a matter of time before 
medical technology advances to the point of finding a cure for aging and other ailments that now 
seem inevitable. Robert M. Geraci states that “Purely biological solutions…include neuro-
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pharmacology, to…enhance mental abilities, stem cell research, to regenerate limbs and organs, 
and genetic engineering, for therapeutic and enhancement purposes.”13 There are obviously a 
number of problems to solve in this direction, but perhaps the biggest single obstacle to 
overcome is basic cell degeneration. Optimists will point to existing species, such as Turritopsis 
dohrnii (a.k.a. the immortal jellyfish), that seem to do a better job of maintaining cellular 
robustness, or to recent studies that have had success in radically extending the lifespan of mice, 
as offering hope that strategies applicable to humans might be identified.14 If the timeline for 
developing such strategies seems too long given your already advanced age, there is no need to 
feel left out because cryonic preservation currently provides you the opportunity to buy some 
extra time while medical science works things out. Of course, reviving someone after the 
preservation process presents a new set of challenges, but the thinking is that medical technology 
advanced enough to reverse aging would probably be able to tackle these problems as well.15 
 But even if such optimistic medical prognostications are accurate, and death becomes 
unnecessary, we still remain susceptible to accidents as long as we are bound to these flimsy 
organic bodies. So the next step would involve cyborgization or perhaps the transplanting of 
brains into more durable artificial bodies.16 Unfortunately, while this might save us from certain 
small-scale dangers, larger ones might still spell doom for us. At this point in the discussion of 
strategies for attaining personal immortality things move from fairly well defined scenarios to 
the conceptually vague, as “transhumanist promises of immortality through mind-uploading” 
would make reliance on physical form a thing of the past.17 The obvious upside to such a 
possibility is the almost total invulnerability of purely data-based beings (especially if there are 
back-up files of individual persons), but the reduction of selves to mere patterns of information 
begs some pretty serious questions about the nature of personal identity.18 And since the 
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invulnerability is not in fact complete given the precarious future of the universe, some have 
even gone so far as to suggest the rather desperate and fantastical possibility of universe hopping 
in order to avoid whatever sort of doom awaits this one.19 
So how does any of this line up with religious belief? To begin with, it is important to 
notice that both transhumanism and most, if not all, religions premise their hope for a better 
future to come on a sense of alienation from, or dissatisfaction with, the present situation. 
Furthermore, in both cases, one of the major sources (and possibly the major source) of this 
alienation/dissatisfaction is human mortality, and the biological deterioration that comes along 
with it. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson suggests that “evangelicals and transhumanist futurists” alike 
display the following characteristics: “the radical disdain toward the biological human body, the 
strong sense of alienation from the present world, the utopian speculations about the ideal good 
life in which all needs will be fulfilled, and the [desire for the] experience of immortality.”20 
Despite these obvious parallels in both points of departure and future hopes, it is in the means of 
bridging the two that transhumanism and traditional religion seem to come apart. 
For many fervent devotees of Abrahamic traditions, and especially “millions of American 
fundamentalists, the assessment of technology is largely negative except for medicine and for its 
usefulness in promoting their message.”21 However, as mentioned before, it is precisely this 
medical exception that leaves open the possibility of further continuity between transhumanists 
and the religious when it comes to something approximating personal immortality. There are few 
objections, among the latter camp, to pharmaceutical and surgical interventions that grow 
increasingly effective at postponing death due to illness or injury. Although cyborgization is still 
in its infancy, there is also relatively little uproar about the use of things like pacemakers and (at 
least outside of the Deaf community) cochlear implants. Cryonics, stem-cell research, and 
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genetic manipulation admittedly face a bit more resistance from religious communities, but such 
resistance is hardly universal and depends largely upon the specific circumstances surrounding 
the cultivation and implementation of these developing technologies. It is perhaps harder to pin 
down exactly what adherents of Western monotheisms would make of the non-medical 
possibilities of mind-uploading and universe-hopping, largely because it is generally harder to 
determine what these possibilities would mean for personal survival, but even if we assume that 
most fundamentalist-types would be opposed to them, there are other traditions that might be 
more amenable. Hughes claims that 
Buddhists and Hindus have…been more comfortable with transhumanist ideas of 
biological enhancement, machine intelligence and uploading. For instance, the 
Dalai Lama has famously opined that human consciousness could be instantiated 
in a machine…and is actively collaborating with the neuroscientific investigation 
of the brain processes involved in meditation.22 
While it may be true that certain sects of these traditions—in this case a more recent sect 
(originating in the fourteenth century) of Mahāyāna Buddhism—could be compatible with such 
far-fetched technological scenarios,23 it will be my contention going forward that transhumanist 
interest in things like immortality via mind-uploading will run into a profound conflict with some 
of the earliest and most foundational views of Hinduism and Buddhism. 
 
Indian Views of the Self 
To be sure, on the more superficial or lay-centered (i.e. karmic) understandings of even ancient 
Hindu and Buddhist traditions it may be possible to accept the common transhumanist goal of 
personal immortality,24 not to mention more modest medical aims, but at the deepest level of 
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some sects’ soteriologies, these philosophies seem to want humans to give up their attachment to 
personal existence. The famous Vedic formula is that the core self, stripped of all individualizing 
qualities, is something like a part of (or perhaps simply a form of) the singular universal reality. 
Enlightenment (which is not to be confused here with the European historical period discussed 
earlier), on this view, is only possible when one grasps this equation, letting go of one’s ordinary 
sense of personal self and embracing unity with the whole of existence. Despite some very 
important differences, reaching the highest attainment of Theravāda Buddhism (as characterized 
in the Pāli Canon) also requires abandoning common notions of a meaningful and durable 
personal self.25 
In contrast to everyday senses of selfhood that seem to involve one’s memories, 
embodied perspective, social relationships, possessions, accomplishments, and personality traits, 
the Upaniṣads suggest that what one really is at the deepest level is ātman, the true self devoid of 
all these superficial and accidental particularities.26 We are usually fooled by the appearances 
and our “natural” desires and tendencies into becoming quite fond of what we ordinarily think of 
as our genuine and unique selves, but this is a mistaken and dangerous attitude, if the Upaniṣads 
are to be believed. This diagnosis immediately creates a tension between the authors of these 
texts and the transhumanists who enthusiastically, and perhaps somewhat uncritically, associate 
selfhood with particularity and individuality. The problem for the former is that the more 
attached we are to our distinctiveness, the more likely we are to behave in a way that chains us to 
worldly existence, even after death; for it is attachment to our particularities and our 
corresponding worldly interests that keeps us in saṃsāra, the cycle of rebirth based on the 
cosmic credit system known as karma. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad states, “there is here no diversity at 
all! From death to death he goes, who sees here any kind of diversity.”27 In order to reach mokṣa, 
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release from the cycle of worldly rebirth, it seems that we must detach from our particularities 
and interests, realizing that we are essentially ātman and that ātman is nothing other than 
brahman.28 
The concept of brahman is no less abstract and difficult to grasp than the concept of 
ātman, but it basically means the underlying reality that makes up all that is. According to the 
Taittirīya Upaniṣad: “That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and 
into which they pass upon death…That is brahman!”29 Just as ātman is the real self beneath the 
layers of superficial appearances that seem to distinguish me from other individuals, brahman is 
the undifferentiated universal reality upon which all of the merely apparent distinctions of the 
cosmos are built. The world is not a plurality of beings, but one unified whole. As we have seen, 
every person is essentially the same empty (in the sense of “free of individualizing content”) core 
self, and it turns out that this self is ultimately indistinguishable from the rest of existence, 
including divine existence. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says, “If a man knows ‘I am brahman’ 
in this way, he becomes this whole world. Not even the gods are able to prevent it, for he 
becomes their very self (ātman). So when a man venerates another deity, thinking, ‘He is one, 
and I am another’, he does not understand.”30 In attaining the proper understanding, one reaches 
enlightenment, or mokṣa,31 and no longer sees the significance of individual achievement, bodily 
gratification, concern for others, accumulation of karma (positive or negative), or fulfillment of 
any desires.32 In fact, the enlightened “presumably would no longer draw any boundaries within 
the world, and would not know her or his own name.”33 At this point, even death is of no 
consequence because the passing away of individuals is a merely superficial phenomenon that 
results in no meaningful change for brahman.34 If indifference to death is an indispensable aspect 
of reaching enlightenment, then it is doubtful that the monistic worldview described in the 
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Upaniṣads could be entirely compatible with any version of transhumanism that longs for 
personal immortality. 
The early Buddhist response to the metaphysical realities established by the Upaniṣads 
begins with a rather straightforward denial of the existence of ātman (and a corresponding lack 
of interest in discussing the alleged universal reality of brahman), expressed by the term 
“anātman.”35 The man who would become the Buddha grew up in the traditional ancient Indian 
context as a member of a high caste, but he became disenchanted with a life of worldly 
flourishing and opted instead to embark on a religious quest.36 He looked deep into himself as 
the Upaniṣads recommend, but he could find no ultimate core and was forced to conclude that 
there is none. Of course, this does not mean that there is no sense of self at all; it is just that what 
we are left with is the ordinary superficial self, which is really just a transient and accidental 
collection of personality traits, bodily states, thoughts, experiences, and memories.37 
Nonetheless, karma and saṃsāra are still operative for Buddhists,38 although the various 
Buddhist schools disagree about what is reborn when this transient and accidental collection 
known as the “five aggregates” is disintegrated in death.39 James P. McDermott suggests that 
“what is posited is a locus of points in a changing causal stream, rather than a permanent entity 
of any sort which could be said to transmigrate.”40 This changing causal stream is often depicted 
metaphorically as a series of candles (each representing the superficial aggregated self of 
different incarnations) lighting the next one before being extinguished (the continuously burning 
flame perhaps representing karma).41 In any case, the relationship of identity between one living 
individual and whatever persists after his or her death is quite tenuous according to most 
(Western) notions of what identity involves.42 
Given the tenuous nature of this relationship, and the transient insignificance of the 
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ordinary personal self even within a single lifetime, the Buddhist position is that we should not 
be very attached to ourselves or the interests, projects, and associations that come along with 
everyday life. As I suggested when discussing the philosophical foundations of Hinduism above, 
this assessment of ordinary selfhood also makes it difficult for Buddhists and those 
transhumanists who prize their individuality so highly to see eye to eye. Sticking with the candle 
metaphor, nirvana, or enlightenment in the Buddhist context, literally means having this sort of 
attachment/craving/desire “blown out.”43 Detachment is especially pressing here because self-
obsession and the worldly bonds generated by it lead to all varieties of duḥkha, which is often 
translated as “suffering.” Since attachment to the personal self is, at best, a sign of 
misunderstanding the shifting nature of individual existence, and, at worst, the primary source of 
misery in the world, the Buddha also recommends cultivating an attitude of indifference toward 
(one’s own) death.44 Just as in the case of the Upaniṣads, such indifference is a sure sign that the 
early form of Buddhism described here cannot be entirely compatible with any version of 
transhumanism that longs for personal immortality. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that in both cases the problem is not personal 
immortality in itself. It is certainly possible to find claims in the literature about particular 
individuals that have reached either mokṣa or nirvana, but that happen to persist in their 
particularity, either in a body or in some other form;45 annihilation is not a prerequisite for 
reaching enlightenment. In fact, despite calling attention to the impermanence of the aggregated 
self, the Buddha bristles at the suggestion that “he teaches the annihilation, the destruction, the 
extermination of an existing being.”46 While it may not be entirely apparent how to interpret this 
reaction, it is clear enough from the surrounding discussion that he is at least as interested in 
advocating a practical attitude adjustment as he is in championing some metaphysical doctrine or 
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mystical achievement. Metaphysical realities may occupy a somewhat more prominent position 
in the Upaniṣads, but even in this case the primary purpose of coming to terms with the universal 
oneness of things is to generate a similar practical attitude of disdain for the ordinary sense of 
personal self and the entanglements that come along with it. Once this attitude has been 
cultivated, it simply does not matter if an individual continues to exist or not. And this is what 
really distinguishes the philosophical roots of Hinduism and Buddhism, because for 
transhumanists, with their Enlightenment fixation on particular personalities, it seems to matter a 
great deal. At the deepest level, these ancient traditions cannot condone the sort of longing for 
personal continuation (or the attachment to the superficial self that generates it) that can be 
found in most construals of transhumanism.  
 
Conclusion 
This conclusion need not spell doom for further comparison between transhumanism in general 
and the particular ancient Indian religions/philosophies considered here. After all, there are still 
extreme versions of transhumanism that drop extension of particular personalities from their 
agendas. One of them seems to welcome the loss of individuality that comes with mokṣa-like 
immersion in an artificial intelligence that has extended itself throughout the universe;47 and 
another is apparently resigned to the survival of the human legacy, but not human persons, via 
the “Terminator-esque” rise of machines that, although created by humans, will one day find us 
disposable.48 Given that there is some openness to even these rather apocalyptic scenarios, it is 
clearly difficult to identify an absolutely transhumanism-resistant strain of traditional religious 
belief. Nonetheless, it has been worthwhile to explore the idea that, despite all of the recent 
conciliatory literature, there is at least one central goal of most construals of transhumanism that 
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is irredeemably opposed to the deepest philosophical achievements of certain traditions. Rather 
than undermining these recent efforts to consider important commonalities, I have merely 
highlighted a limitation that further comparative work in this area must not ignore.49 
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